Brief analysis of Redaman Banking Malware (v0.6.0.2) Sample

Redaman is a well-known banking malware, discovered around 2015. Recently I have been analyzing a recent version of the malware (0.6.0.2, not sure if latest version, probably one of the newest). This malware uses some interesting tricks probably introduced in these recent versions. In this post I share some notes about the analysis.

• Original Packed Sample: 2b251483ed7705c60ee12b561280a1fc
• Unpacked Sample (dll): 2a298a650b50eb89041548e57d72f726
• Virustotal First Submission: 2019-10-11 10:35:13
• Related links:
• https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/ponys-cc-servers-hidden-inside-the-bitcoin-blockchain/
• https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/russian-language-malspam-pushing-redaman-banking-malware/
• https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Read-The-Manual.pdf

Analysis of the Frenchy Shellcode

In this post I analyze a shellcode that I have named "Frenchy shellcode" because of the mutex that it creates (depending on the version: frenchy_shellcode_01, frenchy_shellcode_002, frenchy_shellcode_003,...). This shellcode has been seen together with different packers and loading different malware families (agenttesla, avemaria stealer, formbook, netwire, etc...). Because of this, I decided to take a look at this shellcode and share my notes. Additionally I share a PoC, a python script that loads Frenchy shellcode and uses it to perform hollow processes and execute calc.exe in the context of notepad.exe.

• Original packed samples
• Frenchy shellcode v1 + autoit packer: 0a1340bb124cd0d79fa19a09c821a049 (Avemaria)
• Frenchy shellcode v2 + autoit packer: d009bfed001586db95623e2896fb93aa 
• Frenchy shellcode v2 + autoit packer: 20de5694d7afa40cf8f0c88c86d22b1d (Formbook)
• Frenchy shellcode v3 + .Net packer: 21c1d45977877018568e8073c3Acf7c5 (Netwire)
• Extracted frenchy shellcodes:
• Frenchy shellcode v1 at hybrid analysis
• Frenchy shellcode v2 at hybrid analysis
• Frenchy shellcode v3 at hybrid analysis
• Related links:
• https://tccontre.blogspot.com/2019/07/autoit-compiled-formbook-malware.html (I recommend to read this post about the AutoIt script that loads frenchy shellcode).
• https://twitter.com/P3pperP0tts/status/1135976656751996928?s=20
• https://twitter.com/JayTHL/status/1146482606185308160?s=20
• https://twitter.com/James_inthe_box/status/1148966237684133888?s=20
• https://cape.contextis.com/analysis/85189/
• https://twitter.com/James_inthe_box/status/1146527056567472128?s=20

Quick Analysis of AgentTesla SMTP Variant Sample (dated 08-05-2019)

In this post I perform a quick analysis of a recent AgentTesla SMTP variant sample, paying special attention to the strings decryptor (most of the interesting information is kept as encrypted strings, smtp server and mail address included), in an attempt for documenting a bit more the decompiled source code with references to the decrypted strings where they are used, to understand how the malware works.

• Original Packed Sample: ae4d420c05281acf9696e558b02a42f8
• Unpacked Sample: f81064db46e305025ac6e2610e272eb3
• Source Url: hxxp://soksanhotels[.]com/calendar/daes/thai8.exe
• Info Url: URLhaus
• Automatic Generated Report: PepperMalware Report
• Virustotal First Submission: 2019-05-08 20:31:00
• Related links:
• https://twitter.com/avman1995/status/1072415443556679681
• https://twitter.com/P3pperP0tts/status/1127239398398013441
• https://www.antiy.net/p/be-aware-of-new-variant-of-agenttesla-commercial-keylogger/
• https://twitter.com/dvk01uk/status/1082151041720897537

Analysis of .Net Stealer GrandSteal (2019-03-18)

In this post I share my notes about the analysis of a sample (an stealer written in .Net) whose family is unknown to me (any feedback is welcome, if you know the family for the sample that I describe, please tell me and I will update this post). Somebody tagged the sample as quasar at Any.Run, however, after analyzing it and comparing with Quasar code, I concluded this sample doesn't seem to belong to Quasar family. Searching information about the collected IoCs was not successful to classify the sample. I am calling it GrandSteal because of the internal names of the .Net classes of the malware's decompiled code.

• Original Packed Sample: 89782B6CDAAAB7848D544255D5FE7002
• Source Url: http://a4.doshimotai[.]ru/pxpx.exe
• Info Url: VxVault URLhaus
• Automatic Generated Report: PepperMalware Report
• Virustotal First Submission: 2019-03-18 22:28:20
• Any.Run Analysis: Here
• Any.Run Tags: Evasion, Trojan, Rat, Quasar
• My Classification: I named it GrandSteal because of the internal .Net classes names (if you have any information about any well-known family that this malware belongs to, please, tell me and I will update this post)
• Decompiled Source Code: PepperMalware Github

Analysis of BlackMoon (Banking Trojan)'s Evolution, And The Possibility of a Latest Version Under Development

BlackMoon, also known as KrBanker, is a banking trojan that mainly targets South Korea. I thought this family was dead since time ago (around 2016), however these previous days I got a couple of rencent samples that, after unpacking them and performing a quick analysis, I noticed they were BlackMoon. Virustotal's first submission date for one of these samples is 2018-06-18. First submission date for the other one is 2018-11-01. After digging a bit more into this malware family, my conclussion was that probably there is a latest version of BlackMoon that is under development. I explain it in this post, that I hope you enjoy.

Original Packed Sample: C38E54342CDAE1D9181EC48E94DC5C83

Automatic Generated Report: PepperMalware Report

Virustotal First Submission: 2018-11-01 07:03:51

Unpacked Banker Module: 4634F4EF94D9A3A0E2FCF5078151ADB2

Related links: 

• https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-krbanker-targets-south-korea-through-adware-and-exploit-kits-2/
• https://threatpost.com/blackmoon-banking-trojan-using-new-infection-technique/125425/
• https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/05/19/the-blackmoon-trojan-framework
• https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/over-100-000-south-korean-users-affected-by-blackmoon-campaign.html
• https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/threat-intelligence/blackmoon-banking-trojan-new-framework

Quick Analysis of a Trickbot Sample with NSA's Ghidra SRE Framework

This post is not a deep analysis of TrickBot. Here, I did a quick analysis of a TrickBot sample from early 2019 by using the Ghidra Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) Framework, developed by the NSA, that was released some hours ago. This is not a deep analysis of TrickBot, I only wanted to learn a bit about Ghidra and I used this framework to find some interesting parts of the code of TrickBot that were introduced in the newer versions of the malware. Hope you enjoy it!

Analysis of Neutrino Bot Sample (dated 2018-08-27)

In this post I analyze a Neutrino Bot sample. It was probably generated 2018-08-27. I will compare the analyzed Neutrino sample with the NukeBot's source code that was leaked on spring, 2017, and I will check that Neutrino Bot is probably an evolution (or, at least, it reuses parts) of the NukeBot leaked code.

• Original Packed Sample: 3F77B24C569600E73F9C112B9E7BE43F
• Automatic Generated Report: PepperMalware Report
• Virustotal First Submission: 2018-08-28 14:36:26
• Sample Creation Date:  2018-08-27
• Unpacked Banker Module: 896609A8EE8CC860C2214FCD1E3CF264
• Internal executable id: aug27
• Related links: 
• https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2018/08/21/index2.html
• https://twitter.com/malware_traffic/status/1032066941953945600
• https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/02/new-neutrino-bot-comes-in-a-protective-loader/
• https://securelist.com/jimmy-nukebot-from-neutrino-with-love/81667/